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INTRODUCTION
What is the relationship between US law and international
law? This is the core question of the academic field of foreign relations law, but it is also a life-or-death issue for some people. In
recent years, a series of cases involving death-row defendants has
made its way to the federal courts, presenting a novel set of
claims. This Essay discusses one such case, Garza v Lappin,1 decided in 2001. The opinion by Judge Diane Wood is characteristically scrupulous, but is not among her best known, and was
hardly controversial at the time.2 Still, it is a useful case to illustrate the range of possible relationships between international
human rights law and domestic courts, an issue of increasing importance around the globe.3
This Essay will examine Judge Wood’s approach in light of
other possible angles taken by various judges—both those working in the US and outside of it—in recent years. It first considers
possible relationships between domestic law and international
human rights law. It then examines the opinion in Garza in light
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of these approaches, finding the opinion notable for taking international legal norms seriously and giving them their due weight.
While they did not have an impact on the outcome of Juan Raul
Garza’s habeas petition, the international norms are framed as
ultimately complementary of domestic regulation; they do not
substitute for it.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS
International law protecting human rights is generally considered by scholars to be an area in which normative development
has exceeded enforcement capacity.4 Courts and tribunals established to protect human rights are characterized as fairly weak,
and lacking powerful mechanisms for enforcing their decisions.5
But that statement must be qualified, as the efficacy of the international machinery is almost entirely a function of its interaction
with national legal orders, which varies widely across countries.
The power of international law generally, and human rights law
in particular, depends on the specific receptivity of national governments to claims based on it. Surely, when a government is recalcitrant, there is little that an international court can do on its
own to enforce its judgments. But there are many countries which
do take seriously the rulings of international tribunals, and a
growing number of jurisdictions in which human rights law is incorporated into national law as a matter of constitutional text or
supreme court jurisprudence. In 2013, for example, the Mexican
Supreme Court incorporated the American Convention of Human
Rights into domestic law.6 The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has articulated a doctrine known as “conventionality control,” holding that the entire body of regional human rights law is
binding on every court in the hemisphere, in some cases trumping
national constitutional law.7 And many national constitutions
stipulate that international human rights law is directly binding
on national courts interpreting rights provisions.8 Constitutional

4

See, for example, Louis Henkin, The Age of Rights 22–24 (Columbia 1990).
Eric A. Posner, The Twilight of Human Rights Law 96, 103–04 (Oxford 2014).
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See Karina Ansolabehere, One Norm, Two Models. Legal Enforcement of Human
Rights in Mexico and the United States, 8 Mexican L Rev 93, 118 (2016).
7
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49–50, 60–62 (2015).
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courts in many countries act accordingly, accepting the pronouncements of international bodies as binding and authoritative.
The United States is not such a country, at least with regard
to human rights treaty norms. Instead, treaties are only held to
bind domestic courts if they are “self-executing” or if they are incorporated into US law by statute.9 Absent clear indication that the
treaty is intended to create directly enforceable rights, US courts
tend to hold that there must be a legislative act incorporating international norms before they can be relied on by individuals.10
Why might different countries take different stances with regard to the enforceability and application of international law?
Why, to put the point sharply, are US courts so different from
those of Mexico? A traditional answer might focus on something
like legal culture. Traditions in the United States of self-reliance,
exceptionalism, and independence from the rest of the world
mean that there is little to be gained by subjecting ourselves to
foreign tribunals and their judgments. Europeans tend to be more
comfortable with international delegations and supranational
government, perhaps because the close proximity of countries has
produced a culture of interaction. Latin Americans have long led
in articulating regional norms of human rights, perhaps because
of their history of overbearing authoritarian governments which
has engendered a culture of rights-claiming. And some Asian cultures, it is sometimes asserted, emphasize duties to the collective
over individual rights,11 partially explaining why the region lacks
a human rights court.
Cultural explanations cannot really account for changes over
time. Why did the Mexican Supreme Court change its stance in
recent years? Why do some Asian jurisdictions look outward more
than others? Why has the number of national courts expressing

9
Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
§ 310(1) (2018).
10 See, for example, Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692, 735 (2004) (explaining that
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was ratified “on the express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts”).
11 See Joseph Chan, A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary
China, in Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds, The East Asian Challenge for Human
Rights 212, 215 (Cambridge 1999) (noting the “common view” among some scholars of
Confucianism that “Confucianism is incompatible with human rights”).
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skepticism about international law begun to increase in recent
years?12
Another way of answering the question of variation is to look
at incentives. International relations scholarship has emphasized
the importance of human rights treaties to “tie[ ] the hands” of
governments without other means of making credible commitments.13 One idea is that countries that are established democracies have less marginal utility for international human rights institutions, because they have domestic machinery that can
effectively deliver credibility. Our own courts, the argument goes,
are able to adjudicate rights claims, and so we don’t need external
monitoring. In contrast, countries with weaker domestic enforcement machinery may not be able to make believable promises to
their citizens, absent some external mechanism of holding government’s feet to the fire for violations. Furthermore, new democracies without a history of democratic governance will have a particular need for international human rights commitments,
because their citizens will be unlikely to believe that their promises will be adequately protected by future governments who
might revert to authoritarianism. It is no surprise that both the
European Convention on Human Rights,14 created by the Council
of Europe, and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties
of Man,15 issued by the Organization of American States, were
promulgated in periods of fragile democracy in those respective
regions.16 These instruments were meant to secure human rights
among states which had recent histories of authoritarianism. Mutual monitoring and external enforcement would help to prevent
backsliding.
This approach seems to account for the United States’ resistance to international human rights law. Robust domestic
12 See Mikael Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak, and Micha Wiebusch, Backlash Against
International Courts: Explaining the Forms and Patterns of Resistance to International
Courts, 14 Intl J L in Context 197, 197 (2018).
13 See, for example, Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 Intl Org 217, 228 (2000).
14 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
UNTS 221 (1950).
15 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Off Rec, OEA/Ser
L/V/II 23 Doc 21 (1948).
16 For further discussion, see Alexandra Huneeus and Mikael Rask Madsen, Between
Universalism and Regional Law and Politics: A Comparative History of the American, European, and African Human Rights Systems, 16 Intl J Const L 136, 139–41 (2018); Ed
Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From Its Inception to
the Creation of a Permanent Court of Human Rights 49–51 (Oxford 2010).
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traditions of rights protection, the argument goes, obviate the
need for allowing international human rights institutions direct
governance responsibility over US residents. To be sure, this
claim belies the fact that in many areas, the rights enforcement
of the federal courts is really fairly weak. Courts and Congress
have constructed an array of doctrinal and procedural barriers to
“ration[ ]” effective remedies, making it difficult to actually vindicate constitutional rights.17 But in any case, my primary concern
here is not to determine whether or why the United States is or
is not exceptional.18 Instead, it is to consider how different possible approaches might be pursued by jurists and constitutional designers in mediating the relationship between international and
domestic norms.
II. SUBSTITUTES, COMPLEMENTS, AND IRRITANTS
I like to think of the relationship between domestic and international law using a framework of substitutes, complements,
and irritants.19 This Part briefly lays out these concepts and provides some examples.
In economics, a “substitute” is a good that can be used in place
of another, so that when the price of one good goes up, demand for
its substitutes increases.20 Applied to the field of governance, a
substitute implies that one legal instrument can do the job as well
as another and can be used alternatively. The famous 1920 case
of Missouri v Holland,21 in which an international treaty to protect migratory birds served to bypass constitutional limits on domestic legislation, illustrates the substitution dynamic.22 In that
case, Congress responded to a court decision striking down its
17 Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies,
65 Duke L J 1, 12–13 (2015).
18 For an article that does engage in such a discussion, see generally Anu Bradford
and Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 Harv Intl L J 1
(2011) (arguing that the United States, the European Union, and China all advance their
own exceptionalist views of international law according to their particular interests).
19 For prior work using this framework, see Tom Ginsburg, Constitutions and Foreign Relations Law: The Dynamics of Substitutes and Complements, 111 Am J Intl L Unbound 326, 328–29 (2017); Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 Intl Rev L Econ 107, 113 (2005);
Rachel Brewster, The Domestic Origins of International Agreements, 44 Va J Intl L 501,
502–03 (2004) (arguing that treaties substitute for statutes).
20 See David W. Pearce, ed, The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics 414 (MIT 4th
ed 1992).
21 252 US 416 (1920).
22 Id at 430–32.

2362

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:2357

domestic legislation on migratory birds by ratifying a treaty with
Canada that accomplished largely the same ends.23 When the Supreme Court held that the treaty was effective and constitutional,24 it set up a system of legal substitutes: one instrument
effectively substituted for another. International law could do the
job of domestic law, and the government had some flexibility in
choosing which instrument to use.
In contrast, a “complement” is a good whose consumption enhances demand for the primary good.25 When the price of a primary good increases, demand for complements falls. In the realm
of governance, this refers to a relationship among instruments in
which two can work together in conjunction, and in fact may be
superior to either one pursued on its own. Protection of intellectual property rights, for example, may work well at a national
level, but will be superior if there are international treaties that
extend this protection to different markets.
Note that there may be an asymmetry at work, in that legal
protection at one level might be more elastic to changes in the
other than vice versa. Consider the intellectual property example.
An international treaty to protect intellectual property will not be
of much use if all the domestic systems are weak and fail to provide for protection, because most violations occur within the
boundaries of nation-states. In contrast, a system of strong domestic protections without an international treaty may in fact handle
most of the relevant violations, so that the “complementarity” benefit of international law to domestic law is not as great as the reverse, even though simultaneous protection at both levels is
unambiguously better.
Focusing narrowly on the field of human rights, it is clear
that most violations occur within nation-states. But international
treaties can do several things which complement the domestic
level. They can help to define relevant rules, allowing states to
coordinate on common definitions. They can set up institutions to
monitor national performance, providing resources for domestic
interest groups, transnational bodies, and other governments to
pressure states toward better performance. And they can adjudicate particular violations, providing clarity and credibility to the
enforcement machinery. These are all functions that are complementary in character.
23
24
25

Id.
Id at 435.
See Pearce, ed, The MIT Dictionary of Modern Economics at 73, 91 (cited in note 20).
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Whether states view international law as complementary or
substitutive may depend on their internal institutional structure,
the need to make credible commitments, and the reputation of the
government. As noted above, many new democracies have found
great benefit in supplementing domestic rights promises with a
degree of openness to the international community. Russia’s Constitution of 1993 adopted a very open attitude toward international law, stating that it recognizes rights and freedoms in accordance with “universally recognized principles and norms of
international law.”26 This made some sense in a moment when it
looked like Russia might democratize. But constitutional amendments to extend the term of President Vladimir Putin modified
the text to place the constitution above international law.27 As
Russia has become stronger and more authoritarian, the need for
this signaling has become less important.
The Russia case allows us to turn to a third possible relationship between domestic and international law, namely that an international norm might be a kind of “irritant” to the domestic legal order. The term comes from Professor Gunther Teubner, the
systems theorist who used an organic analogy to analyze how legal rules travel across borders.28 Instead of the usual metaphor of
legal rules being “transplanted” from one legal system to another,
Teubner noted that when a foreign rule enters a domestic legal
culture, it may not be accepted seamlessly. Instead, it can irritate
the functioning of the law and the law’s relationship with other
social systems, triggering “new and unexpected events.”29 For a
legal system like that of Russia today, the international human
rights system is more of an irritant than a complement. While it
may have been framed as complementary twenty years ago at the
time of ratification, the fact that tens of thousands of litigants
have challenged Russia before the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) has led Russian judges to move away from the
idea that ECHR judgments are directly enforceable.30 Instead, each
will be scrutinized for compatibility with the Russian Constitution.
26

Rus Const § 1, Ch 2, Art 17, cl 1.
See Jonathan H. Hines, Jennifer A. Josefson, Vasilisa Strizh, and Alexander V.
Marchenko, Russia Adopts Major Amendments to Its Constitution (Lexology, July 13,
2020), archived at https://perma.cc/XZ57-4NYD.
28 See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying
Law Ends up in New Divergences, 61 Modern L Rev 11, 12 (1998).
29 Id.
30 Lauri Mälksoo, The European Court of Human Rights and Russia: Quo Vadis?,
(fifteeneightyfour, Nov 22, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/YD33-3TQF. But see
27
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My assertion in this Essay is that whether international human rights norms operate as complements, substitutes, or irritants is partly a function of framing by judges and other legal actors. If international norms are perceived as irritants, judges
must do their best to repel them, and certainly not let them enter
the host body of national law. Something like this can be seen in
Justice Antonin Scalia’s famous attack on Justice John Paul Stevens’s opinion in Thompson v Oklahoma,31 the case finding the
application of the death penalty to juveniles constitutionally suspect.32 In response to Justice Stevens’s noting a trend away from
capital punishment in other industrial democracies, Justice
Scalia sharply retorted that “[w]e must never forget that it is a
Constitution for the United States of America that we are expounding.”33 Other countries’ judicial interpretations could only
muddy the waters and pollute our law.
Justice Scalia’s view is of a constitutional order that is or
should be hermetically sealed from external influences in interpretation. While consistent with positivist accounts of law, his
view has been challenged. Justice Stephen Breyer, for example,
has forcefully articulated a defense of judicial engagement with
foreign legal materials as being essential to the role of courts in
an increasingly globalized world.34 And scholars like Professors
Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein have pointed out that it is often
possible to learn from practices of other states.35 Even within the
United States, they note, state courts frequently cite each other’s
decisions, notwithstanding the fact that they have no value as
binding law.36 This vigorous debate contrasts those who see foreign law as complementary and those who accuse them of using
Anatoly I. Kovler, European Convention on Human Rights in Russia, 374 L’Europe en
Formation 116, 116 (Winter 2014) (noting that the Russian State Duma “sent a clear signal that . . . the Russian Federation recognizes the jurisdiction of the European Court of
Human Rights as binding” when it ratified the Convention on Human Rights).
31 487 US 815 (1988).
32 Id at 838.
33 Id at 868 n 4 (Scalia dissenting). See also Atkins v Virginia, 536 US 304, 347–48
(2002) (Scalia dissenting) (dismissing as irrelevant “the practices of the ‘world community,’
whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people”); Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia dissenting) (stating that “the basic premise of the
Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the law of the rest of the world—
ought to be rejected out of hand”).
34 See Stephen Breyer, The Court and the World: American Law and the New Global
Realities 7 (Vintage 2015).
35 Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 Stan L Rev 131,
171 (2006).
36 Id at 133–35.
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it as a substitute for US law. Indeed, because of this threat of invasion of foreign material into the corpus juris, some of these writers frame foreign law as an irritant.
In a book-length exploration of the issue of how judges should
engage with foreign and international law in the course of constitutional interpretation, Professor Vicki Jackson has called for a
posture of cautious engagement with transnational materials.37
She views this stance as a kind of middle ground between approaches like Justice Scalia’s, which she characterizes as one of
“resistance,” and those who would argue for “convergence” of
norms, without regard to national-level differences.38 The latter
may in some cases be required by constitutional or international
law, and national courts have sometimes chosen to construe their
domestic laws in accordance with international human rights law.
In Jackson’s framework, judicial engagement with foreign
materials has at least two modes.39 One she calls deliberative engagement, which is focused “on the degree to which considering
international or foreign material can aid the judge in a deeper, or
better, appreciation of her own constitution and in attaining that
distance from her own situation which may promote more impartial decision-making.”40 In this mode there is no obligation to consider foreign or international law, but it is seen as complementing
domestic interpretation. The second mode is what she calls relational, in which there is either a legal or felt obligation to consider
transnational sources. As she put it in an earlier work:
What is important here is that foreign and especially relevant international law must be considered, though not necessarily followed. On this view, elsewhere described as recognizing the “relational authority” of foreign courts’ decisions
on issues of domestic constitutional law, foreign and international law, especially on human rights, have a decided gravitational pull, if they concern parallel commitments and decisions and especially if they represent a consensus or decisive
trend. This pull . . . demands consideration, though not necessarily convergence.41
37 Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Engagement in a Transnational Era 255–56 (Oxford 2010).
38 Id at 8, 17.
39 Id at 72–73.
40 Vicki C. Jackson, Transnational Challenges to Constitutional Law: Convergence,
Resistance, Engagement, 35 Fed L Rev 161, 175 (2007).
41 Id at 175–76 (citation omitted).
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In other words, judges should take international sources seriously
but are under no obligation to adopt solutions adopted elsewhere.
In this mode, the framing of law as an irritant is gone. Judges are
perfectly capable of taking international norms seriously without
risking the integrity of the constitutional order. The two levels
are, in theory, complements.
Jackson looks at the problem from the perspective of national
constitutional judges. International lawyers and judges tend to
have a different perspective. Their concern is not whether to engage with domestic norms, for it is nearly always the case that
effective international adjudication requires domestic actors to
implement a decision. This means there is little choice in the matter. Some international judges respond by insisting on the normative primacy of international law, treating it essentially as a substitute for domestic lawmaking. The Inter-American Court’s
doctrine of conventionality control, referred to above, is an example.42 However, international judges sometimes take a stance of
more complementarity, as when they grant a degree of deference
to national authorities. The ECHR, for example, has adopted the
doctrine of the margin of appreciation, in which it will allow national actors some leeway in their interpretation of rights under
the European Convention on Human Rights.43 This approach is
one which sees national systems of human rights protection and
the international system as essentially complementary.
In short, when adjudicating claims that implicate the relationship between national and international law, judges have an
array of possible approaches. These are, of course, sometimes determined by positive law, and the articulated relationship between international and domestic norms in law. Yet in their attitudes, judges also exhibit moods that frame the relationship,
including attitudes of irritation, or of viewing the two levels as
effective substitutes or complements. With these preliminaries
out of the way, let us now turn to the Garza case.
III. THE GARZA CASE
The petitioner, Juan Raul Garza, was sentenced to death by
a Texas jury for each of three murders committed in furtherance

42

See text accompanying note 7.
See generally Kathleen Cavanaugh, Policing the Margins: Rights Protection and
the European Court of Human Rights, 4 Eur Hum Rts L Rev 422 (2006).
43
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of a continuing criminal enterprise.44 Facing the death penalty, he
exhausted domestic remedies in the United States and then filed
a petition with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“Commission”), a body set up by the Organization of American
States (OAS).45 The OAS is an organization established in 1948,
with thirty-five member states throughout the Western hemisphere.46 The OAS has created several legal instruments related
to human rights, of which the two most important are the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948 (American Declaration), and the American Convention on Human
Rights of 1969 (American Convention).47 The American Declaration is a statement of human rights applicable in the region,
though not explicitly legally binding.48 The American Convention,
on the other hand, is a binding treaty that also calls for the creation of an Inter-American Court of Human Rights.49 Eventually
established in 1978 when the American Convention entered into
force, this body adjudicates cases of alleged human rights violations by state parties; it also issues advisory opinions interpreting
primary legal texts at the request of the OAS itself, an OAS organ,
or a member state.50
The OAS Charter calls for the creation of the Commission,
with the role to “promote the observance and protection of human
rights.”51 Created in 1959, the Commission’s current role is to accept petitions asserting violations of the American Declaration. If
the Inter-American Commission finds a violation, it can visit
44

Garza, 253 F3d at 919–20.
Id at 920.
46 Organization of American States, About Us, archived at https://perma.cc/
6DUE-YB38.
47 The American Declaration was signed in Bogotá, Colombia, in April 1948, at the
Ninth International Conference of American States. It was ratified on May 2, 1948, preceding the ratification of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights by
seven months. See American Declaration at 1 (cited in note 15). The American Convention,
also known as the “Pact of San José,” was adopted on November 22, 1969, in San José,
Costa Rica. It entered into force in 1978 when an eleventh state acceded to the American
Convention. See American Convention on Human Rights, “Pact of San José, Costa Rica,”
1144 UNTS 123, 144 (1969). In addition, in 1990 the OAS promulgated a Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty. This Protocol was
adopted on June 8, 1990, in Asunción, Paraguay. Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, The Death Penalty in the Inter-American Human Rights System: From Restrictions
to Abolition *4 n 6 (2011), archived at https://perma.cc/WR6K-92H3.
48 See generally American Declaration (cited in note 15).
49 American Convention, Art 33, 1144 UNTS at 153 (cited in note 47).
50 American Convention, Arts 63–64, 1144 UNTS at 159–60 (cited in note 47).
51 Organization of American States, Charter of the Organization of American States
Part Two, Ch XV, Art 106, archived at https://perma.cc/X85N-U2QM.
45
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member states and issue findings, or, if the country concerned is
a state party to the American Convention, file a case before the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.52 The Commission’s
rules call for the exhaustion of domestic remedies before a petition is admissible.53
Garza asserted several violations of his rights embodied in
the regional instruments. Although both the American Declaration and the American Convention recognize a right to life, neither prohibits the death penalty. The American Declaration is silent, likely because of its age.54 Article 4 of the American
Convention provides certain limits on the death penalty for those
countries that have not yet abolished it.55 But Garza’s main claim
was a violation of his rights to due process and a fair trial under
the American Declaration.56
The Commission heard Garza’s petition and found a procedural violation in sentencing, namely that the government had
introduced evidence of five murders Garza had allegedly committed in Mexico, in addition to the three he was being tried for.
While this is perfectly legal under US sentencing law, the Commission found that it violated the American Declaration’s guarantees of due process and a fair trial, and recommended that the
United States commute Garza’s sentence and reform its evidentiary laws.57 Armed with the Commission’s finding, Garza raised
a petition for habeas corpus, which the district court denied; Garza
then appealed to the Seventh Circuit for a stay of execution.58
The most complex issue before the court was a procedural
question about jurisdiction.59 The jurisdictional question involved
52 Organization of American States, What Is the IACHR?, archived at
https://perma.cc/B3U9-EGP2.
53 Organization of American States, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Title II, Ch II, Art 31, archived at https://perma.cc/
8ECA-WWCB; American Convention, Arts 46, 48–50, 61, 1144 UNTS at 155–57, 159 (cited
in note 47).
54 The European Convention on Human Rights, adopted in 1950, similarly did not
abolish the death penalty, instead adopting an Optional Protocol decades later. See Protocol No 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Council of Europe, ETS No 114, 22
ILM 538 (1983).
55 American Convention, Art 4, 1144 UNTS at 145 (cited in note 47).
56 See American Declaration, Art XVIII (cited in note 15) (guaranteeing the right to
a fair trial); American Declaration, Art XXVI (cited in note 15) (guaranteeing the right to
due process).
57 Garza v United States, Case 12.243, Rep No 52/01, ¶ 39 (Inter-Am Ct Hum Rts 2000).
58 Garza, 253 F3d at 920.
59 See id at 920–24.
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the intersection of 28 USC § 2255 and 28 USC § 2241, the two
statutes that govern habeas challenges brought by prisoners. In
general, federal prisoners who want to appeal their convictions or
sentences must do so under § 2255, but Garza’s application was
brought under § 2241.60 Second or successive petitions to challenge a conviction under § 2255 are prohibited without a court’s
permission; moreover, § 2255 specifically prohibits challenging
convictions under § 2241.61 However, § 2255 does carve out an exception to this latter prohibition in the form of its “savings
clause,” according to which a prisoner may bring a § 2241 petition
if the § 2255 remedy “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.”62 In her decision, Judge Wood concluded that Garza’s case satisfied this savings clause exception.63
Garza’s central argument was not that the American Convention was directly applicable under US law, a claim that would
likely fail on its face. Instead, it was that an international treaty
obligation was created by the Commission’s report, which claimed
that his execution violated international law.64 Because of exhaustion requirements under the American Convention, there was no
way this could have been obtained before his first habeas filing.
It was the very act of issuing the report that created this judicially
enforceable right, and before that act was performed on April 4,
2001, no such right existed.65 It therefore would have been impossible for Garza to have argued in his initial § 2255 petition that
his conviction violated any treaty obligation. The court concluded
that this was sufficient grounds to satisfy the savings clause, and
that Garza was thus entitled to a petition under § 2241.66
Having established its jurisdiction to hear the case, the court
then considered the merits of Garza’s petition for a stay of execution. In order to successfully obtain a stay of execution, a petitioner must establish that he has presented a “substantial
ground” on which relief could be granted.67 This in turn raised the
question whether the Inter-American Commission Report cited
by Garza created an enforceable and binding obligation on the
United States. However, the court pointed out that, generally
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id at 921.
Id at 920–21.
Garza, 253 F3d at 921, quoting 28 USC § 2255.
Garza, 253 F3d at 922.
Id at 923.
Id.
Id.
Delo v Stokes, 495 US 320, 321 (1990).
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speaking, international agreements can generate this sort of domestically enforceable private right if and only if such rights are
explicitly contemplated in the agreement in question.68 The court
found that there was no evidence that the treaties cited by Garza
created the sort of privately enforceable rights his petition required.69 There were three operative documents in this case: the
OAS Charter, ratified by the United States in 1951; the American
Declaration, developed by the OAS; and the American Convention, also developed by the OAS, which the United States signed
in 1978 but never ratified.70 As noted above, the American Declaration is only an aspirational document, and thus does not by its
own terms create enforceable obligations for OAS member states
(which Garza himself admitted in his petition).71 In contrast, the
court recognized that the American Convention does obligate its
member states to submit to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court and treat them as binding; however, the United States has
not ratified the American Convention, so it fails to carry the full
force of a binding treaty.72
The opinion is remarkable for its taking seriously the international instruments. Noting that “[n]o court of appeals has yet
decided whether the Inter-American Commission’s decisions create obligations binding on the United States,” Judge Wood tackled
the question by first looking at the instruments themselves.73 The
OAS itself recognizes the substantive difference between the obligations incumbent on member states that have ratified the
American Convention and those (like the United States) that
have not. According to the Statute of the Inter-American Commission, the Commission can only issue recommendations to the governments of OAS nonratifying member states, which are not binding by their own terms.74 While member states, including the
United States, that have not ratified the American Convention
may still be addressed by the Commission,75 they are subject only
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Garza, 253 F3d at 924.
Id at 926.
70 Id at 924–25. See also Joseph Diab, United States Ratification of the American
Convention on Human Rights, 2 Duke J Comp & Intl L 323, 324–26 (1992).
71 Garza, 253 F3d at 925.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Off Rec
OEA/Ser P/IX 0.2/80, Art 20 (1979):
69
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to the obligations created by the OAS Charter and the American
Declaration; moreover, the Statute explicitly enumerates the
powers that the Commission is granted with respect to these
member states.76 The court’s readings both of this Statute and of
the OAS Charter concluded that no judicially enforceable obligations were created.77 The OAS Charter’s references to the American Convention indeed imply that the Charter itself was not intended to serve the purpose of creating binding obligations on its
signatories, instead deferring that power to another legal instrument altogether (namely, the American Convention).78 In light of
the extremely slim likelihood that this sort of nonbinding recommendation could create a judicially cognizable right in an individual, the court concluded that Garza’s chances of success on the
merits were not “substantial,” and therefore denied his request
for a stay of execution.79 Garza’s appeal to the Supreme Court for
a stay was denied,80 and he was executed on June 19, 2001.81
The Inter-American Commission reacted strongly, deploring
“the failure of the United States and the state of Indiana to comply with [the] recommendation, an act which constitutes a violation of the [United States’] international human rights obligations under the Charter of the Organization of American States
and related instruments as an OAS Member State.”82 The Commission thus read the opinion as failing to recognize its superior
role in adjudicating this question; it sought to substitute its own
views on procedural fairness for those of the US legal system.
The framing of the American Declaration as binding on the
United States has been slowly creeping into the jurisprudence of
In relation to those member states of the Organization that are not parties to
the American Convention on Human Rights, the Commission shall have the following powers . . . (b) to examine communications submitted to it and any other
available information, to address the government of any member state not a
Party to the Convention for information deemed pertinent by this Commission,
and to make recommendations to it, when it finds this appropriate, in order to
bring about more effective observance of fundamental human rights.
76

See id.
Garza, 253 F3d at 925–26.
78 Id at 925 (“[T]he OAS Charter’s reference to the Convention shows that the signatories to the Charter intended to leave for another day any agreement to create an international human rights organization with the power to bind members.”).
79 Id at 926.
80 Garza v Lappin, 533 US 924, 924 (2001).
81 Death Penalty Information Center, Executions Under the Federal Death Penalty,
archived at https://perma.cc/SBV8-XLUT.
82 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Follow-up Factsheet of Report
No. 52/01 ¶ 8 (2018) (“Commission Follow-up Report”).
77
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the Inter-American Court as well. While acknowledging that the
American Declaration is not a treaty, the Inter-American Court
found that the Commission was empowered by Article 106 of the
OAS Charter to protect those rights found in the American Declaration. Because the American Charter is a binding treaty, the
court said, it has legal effect, and the fact that “the Declaration is
not a treaty does not, then, lead to the conclusion that it does not
have legal effect, nor that the Court lacks the power to interpret
it” through the channel of the OAS Charter.83 Although the InterAmerican Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over states not party
to the American Convention, the Commission nevertheless maintains that the American Declaration acquired legally binding
force when the OAS Charter was amended in 1967 and provided
for the creation of the American Convention. This amendment,
combined with Articles 1(2)(b) and 20 of the Commission’s Statute, incorporated the American Declaration by reference into the
OAS Charter, arguably elevating the normative status of the
American Declaration’s contents to that of a treaty.84 The Commission has further argued that member states are bound by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 to exercise good
faith in complying with its recommendations.85
From the perspective of the OAS, Judge Wood was substituting US law for an international obligation. However, her own
treatment of it was much more as a complement. Her handling of
the habeas petition in the case illustrates Judge Wood’s scrupulous procedural fairness and rigor, and is uncontroversial in its
statement of the status of the relevant international law in the
83 Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC‐10/89, 29 ILM 379, 390 at ¶ 47 (Inter-Am Ct Hum Rts 1989). See also
Commission Follow-up Report ¶ 11 (cited in note 82) (“[T]he American Declaration is recognized as constituting a source of legal obligation for OAS Member States, including in
particular those States that are not parties to the American Convention on Human
Rights.”).
84 Thomas Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human
Rights, 69 Am J Intl L 828, 835 (1975) (“The human rights provisions of the American
Declaration can today consequently be deemed to derive their normative character from
the OAS Charter itself.”).
85 Commission Follow-up Report ¶ 11 (cited in note 82). While the United States
signed the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1970, it has not ratified it. See
US Department of State, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, archived at
https://perma.cc/E7SZ-9MVD. The US executive branch and courts generally treat the Vienna Convention provisions as embodying customary international law. See Stephen P.
Mulligan, International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon US Law 2 n 13 (Congressional Research Service, Sept 19, 2018).
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United States. There is little doubt that the United States has
consistently adopted the position that the American Declaration
is an aspirational document.86
In her approach, she illustrated Professor Jackson’s strategy
of engagement with the relevant material. International law could
not displace procedural rules in the United States but had to be
carefully assessed in terms of its normative status. One might imagine a different jurist, Justice Anthony Kennedy perhaps, who
would have noted that the United States is the only country in the
OAS that retains and actually implements capital punishment.87
But Judge Wood took international law on its own terms, examining the actual legal value of the relevant instruments.
To illustrate how distinct this approach is, let us engage in
an exercise of “social-science fiction.”88 Suppose that the United
States had ratified the American Convention and was thus obligated to obey the pronouncement of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. Under the terms of the Convention, member
states are obligated to implement the rulings of the Court.89 Suppose further that the Inter-American Court ruled that Garza was
entitled to a stay of execution. Judge Wood, ruling in 2001, would
likely have found that the Inter-American Court had created a
binding legal obligation on the United States, and that, as a matter of law, Garza had demonstrated a “substantial ground” upon
which relief could be granted. One can very plausibly imagine the
stay being granted for further proceedings, during which a US
court would weigh the particular findings of the Inter-American
Court in light of habeas law. Whether Garza would have ultimately prevailed is beside the point for present purposes. The
point is that a change in the relevant status would make a difference in the analysis of any judge, not just one adopting a mood of
considering international norms as complements.

86 See Advisory Opinion OC‐10/89, 29 ILM at 381–82 ¶ 12 (quoting the US position
in response to the Inter-American Court’s assessment of the normative status of the American Declaration).
87 The other thirteen “retentionist member states” have not enforced the death penalty in at least a decade, and most for much longer. See The Death Penalty Project, InterAmerican Commission Urges Retentionist Member States Within the OAS to Eliminate the
Death Penalty (Dec 19, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/B55R-TEBA. See also Organization of American States, IACHR Welcomes Abolition of Death Penalty in New Hampshire, United States (Jan 17, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/3AP4-7LTZ.
88 For examples of social-science fiction, see generally Nelson Polsby, ed, What If?
Explorations in Social-Science Fiction (Lewis 1982).
89 See American Convention, Art 68, 1144 UNTS at 160 (cited in note 47).
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This is not the approach the US Supreme Court has taken in
recent years. Consider the series of cases involving death row inmates who have claimed that the United States has failed its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations90
(Vienna Convention) to provide notification of consular rights.
Two of these cases ended up before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations with authority to review disputes under the Vienna Convention.91 Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, foreign nationals arrested in the territory of a state party have the right to
consular notification.92 While the United States ratified the Vienna Convention in 1969, many US law enforcement agencies do
not routinely provide notice of this right, and there is a lack of
consensus among domestic courts in the United States as to
whether Article 36 confers an individual right to consular notification.93 However, the US Supreme Court, in three cases, has not
decided the issue.94
The ICJ held that Article 36 did indeed confer an individual
right to consular notification and held that the United States had
breached its duty under the Vienna Convention. It called on the
United States to review and reconsider convictions and sentences
of the foreign nationals.95 In Medellin v Texas,96 the Supreme
Court addressed the status of these ICJ rulings.97 Of course, the
United States had ratified the United Nations Charter establishing the ICJ and had thus agreed to comply with any adverse

90 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 596 UNTS 261, TIAS No 8638 (Apr 24,
1963, entered into force March 9, 1967).
91 Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States),
2004 ICJ 12 (Avena); LaGrand Case (Germany v United States), 2001 ICJ 466.
92 Vienna Convention, Art 36, 596 UNTS at 292.
93 Compare, for example, United States v Emuegbunam, 268 F3d 377, 394 (6th Cir
2001) (“[W]e hold that the Vienna Convention does not create a right for a detained foreign
national to consult with the diplomatic representatives of his nation that the federal courts
can enforce.”), with Jogi v Voges, 480 F3d 822, 831 (7th Cir 2007) (“We conclude that even
though many if not most parts of the Vienna Convention address only state-to-state matters, Article 36 confers individual rights on detained nationals.”).
94 Medellin v Texas, 552 US 491, 502–03 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 548 US
331, 343 (2006); Breard v Greene, 523 US 371, 376 (1998) (stating that the Vienna Convention “arguably” confers an individual right to consular assistance).
95 Avena, 2004 ICJ at ¶¶ 106, 121. The Inter-American Court has also held the right
to be an individual one, in an Advisory Opinion. The Right to Information on Consular
Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, § XIII, ¶ 1 (Inter-Am Ct Hum Rts 1999).
96 552 US 491 (2008).
97 Id at 497–98.

2020]

Substitutes, Complements, and Irritants

2375

rulings.98 But in a 6–3 decision authored by Chief Justice John
Roberts, the Court ruled that the UN Charter was not self-executing and thus created no binding obligations within US law.99
In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the UN Charter was
indeed self-executing, and thus “the supreme Law of the Land”
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.100 His approach
reflects his longstanding call for engagement. The judgments of
international tribunals are not substituting for the American legal system, he might have argued. Instead they are complementing it, providing an authoritative interpretation of an international treaty on which domestic courts have not been able to come
to a consensus. He would indeed have directly applied the ICJ
judgment.
I cannot say how a Justice Wood would have come out in the
case, though I suspect she would have been closer to Justice
Breyer’s camp than Chief Justice Roberts’s. In a later habeas decision authored by Judge Richard Dickson Cudahy, the Seventh
Circuit held that a failure of counsel to raise the consular notification issue was cognizable and potentially worthy of an evidentiary hearing to see if prejudice had arisen.101 The Seventh Circuit
noted that in Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon,102 the Supreme Court
had held that Article 36 claims might be raised as part of a Sixth
Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim.103 This is the
paradigm of a complementary role. The international norms may
not be directly binding, substituting for the domestic judgment.
But they (i) can be given effect through domestic norms, and
(ii) can inform our assessment of a procedural claim like ineffective right to counsel.
In short, an approach that does not reject international
norms out of hand as an irritant, or does not accept international
tribunals’ claims that they can substitute for the judgments of domestic courts, represents a kind of noble middle path for judges.
Like Jackson’s concept of engagement, it calls on judges to exercise judgment about the proper relationship of international and
domestic law.

98
99
100
101
102
103

UN Charter Art 94(1); Medellin, 552 US at 507–08.
Medellin, 552 US at 508–09.
Id at 538 (Breyer dissenting), quoting US Const Art VI, cl 2.
Osagiede v United States, 543 F3d 399, 413–14 (7th Cir 2008).
548 US 331 (2006).
Osagiede, 543 F3d at 407.
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CONCLUSION
The opinion in Garza v Lappin is not one of the more important in the Wood canon, and the issue we are focusing on—the
status of international law—was hardly a tough call. One hundred and six courts have cited the case at the time of this writing,
mostly for the analysis of the two habeas statutes, with a handful
noting the analysis of self-executing treaties.104 Yet the approach
Judge Wood took in the case demonstrates many of her great virtues on the bench. The opinion is clear, nonideological, and impeccable in its analysis of procedural issues. She demonstrated
great concern with fairness and took Garza’s arguments seriously. These arguments did not prevail on the merits because the
law of the United States did not give the same weight to the Commission’s report that it was itself asserting. Our law is not as open
to the pronouncements of international bodies as is the law of
some other jurisdictions. But in treating domestic and international law as conceptually complementary, Judge Wood showed a
good deal of good judgment.

104 See Gross v German Foundation Industrial Initiative, 549 F3d 605, 615 (3rd Cir
2008) (citing Garza for the self-executing doctrine); Mora v New York, 524 F3d 183, 193
(2d Cir 2008) (citing Garza for the proposition that “[w]hether a particular international
agreement provides for private enforcement is a matter for judicial interpretation of the
agreement”); Dutton v Warden, FCI Estill, 37 F Appx 51, 53 (4th Cir 2002) (citing Garza
while explaining that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is not selfexecuting and therefore denying habeas relief).

